On the first article about auditing, I tried to show how to configure an Informix Dynamic Server instance to use role separation. The purpose was to prepare the instance for implementation of the various roles involved in the management and audit of the instance.
In this article I will focus on the audit process. We will see how to setup the audit facility and how to define what and who is audited.
Keep in mind the previous article main point: The administration and auditing is prepared for several roles. Whether these roles are played by absolutely different sets of people is really a matter of why are you doing auditing. If you plan to setup a proper auditing environment, and want to be prepared for internal or external auditors than this role separation is crucial. On the other hand, if you're planning to implement auditing in order to gain more knowledge about your instance (what is being done, how often, by whom, from where...) then you can consider playing having each person play more than one role.
In the following paragraphs I will try to answer the following questions:
* What can be audited?
* Who can be audited?
* How do we define who/what is audited?
* How do we control the auditing facility?
* Where and how does the engine store the audit information?
* What do the audit logs contain?
* How painful is the auditing?
After these I will give examples and make a few considerations.
Let's start with the questions...
What can be audited?Informix auditing facility permits us to activate audit per events. This means that we can audit actions. An action can be a command execution, a GRANT operation, execution of stored procedures, creation of tables etc. I have to be clear about one point: Currently, we cannot define audit based on objects. We can only define auditing on actions (and users as we will see next). This means you can activate auditing for GRANTs, but not for GRANTs on a specific table. You can activate audit for execution of stored procedure but not for a specific stored procedure. Some other RDBMS do exactly the opposite: You can audit objects and not actions. In a perfect world we'd probably like to have both. But if we think about it, we can understand Informix perspective. First we should keep in mind that a user can only do what he is allowed to do. If we're trying to answer the question "who did this?" a vague but truthfully answer would be "one of the persons who has the privileges to do that". This will not make auditors happy, but my point is that you can take two paths: define auditing for your sensitive objects, or otherwise define auditing for your sensitive users. Let's see some examples... In Informix you can audit actions like DROP CHUNK, DROP INDEX, DROP TABLE etc... Would you need to define the object in the auditing definition? Of course not... It's better to define the auditing on the action. The WHO and WHAT will be included in the audit log. You can also define auditing for CREATE TABLE, CREATE PROCEDURE etc. These ones can't also be established on objects, because they refer to new objects.
If you're thinking about using auditing to see who saw what in your database you probably have to reconsider your strategy. As I wrote before, people only do what they can. A user can't do more than their privileges let him. If you want to have finer control on what people can access you should probably implement Label Based Access Control (LBAC) to prevent the access instead to trying to check if people accessed what they should not.
Who can be audited?In short: anyone. We activate the auditing for users. Users are anyone from the different roles. In this context a user can be a member of the DBSA group, a member of the users allowed to connect to the instance or a member of the DBSSO group. So, everybody that can access the instance, that can manage the instance, or that can define what is audited can be audited.
I would like to emphasize this: Without any other product, just with the bare Informix software, you can really establish a strong auditing facility that allows you to implement role separation, and you can effectively control your users actions and specially your power users, like the DBAs, DBSAs and DBSSOs. And besides this you also guarantee the integrity of the audit logs against your DBAs and DBSSOs, meaning that they can't change anything or do any cover up action without being spotted by the AAOs. This means more value for your money. Other RDBMs will require other products to implement this. Again,
root is still a possible problem, and
informix is a problem which you can control.
How do we define who/what is audited?I hope you're ready for the technical part! Ok... In Informix, we have a long list of
mnemonics that represent auditable actions. Theoretically, everything we can do within an instance is an action, and has a mnemonic for it. To give you a few examples, let's consider INSERTs, DELETEs, UPDATEs, CREATE TABLE etc. and a few more esoteric like CREATE CAST, onaudit, onbar....
Each of these have a mnemonic like INRW, DLRW, UPRW, CRTB, CRCT, ONAU, ONBR
So, as we saw before, we can audit actions and users. We specify the actions using a list of mnemonics but how do we specify the users? By using the concept of
masks. Informix has three standard masks, usually called global masks and we can define the ones we want. Each mask will be defined with a list of mnemonics by the DBSSOs. The three
global masks are:
- _default
This mask will be applied to any user that doesn't have a specific mask
- _required
This mask will be added to the user mask (or the _default if there is not a specific user mask)
- _exclude
This mask will contain actions that should not be audited
The masks are applied in the order above meaning that first will be the user (or _default) mask, then the _required and then the _exclude. Any conflict will be resolved by the order of the masks, meaning for example that if you specify one action (mnemonic) in the _required and _exclude masks, that action will not be audited.
You probably noticed that these masks start with an underscore. All masks that start with an underscore are called
template masks and you can then use them to create specific user masks.
Note that if you do this and later change the
template it will not change the user's mask.
How do we control the auditing facility?The auditing facility is mainly controlled using the
onaudit command. With it DBSSOs can change/define the user masks and the AAOs can start, stop and reconfigure the audit facility.
Let's check the command usage:
Usage: onaudit [-f file] [-u name] [-r bmsk] [-e eset] [-y]
onaudit [-c] [-n] [-l lev] [-e err] [-p path] [-s size]
action: one of
-a -- add a mask
-d -- delete a mask
-m -- modify a mask
-o -- output a mask
-r bmsk -- name of basemask
-c -- print audit configuration
-n -- start new log file
-l lev -- set ADTMODE
-e err -- set ADTERR
-p path -- set ADTPATH
-s size -- set ADTSIZE
-f file -- include instruction file
-u mask -- name of target/mask
-e eset -- event set added to (+) or removed from (-) mask
-y -- respond yes to all prompts
So, we can create a mask (-a), we can drop a mask (-d), change a mask (-m) or show a mask (-o). These would be options for the DBSSOs.
For AAOs we can change the audit mode (-l), change the behavior in case of error (-e), name the audit log files location (-p) and each audit log size (-s). I will show some examples later, but it's important to explain some of the settings. First, let's take the audit level. We can define the following audit levels:
- 0 - Means audit off
- 1 - Audit is on. No DBSSOs or DBSAs actions are automatically audited
- 3 - Audit is on and all the DBSSOs actions are automatically audited
- 5 - Audit is on and all the DBSAs actions are automatically audited
- 7 - Audit is on and all the DBSSOs and DBSAs actions are automatically audited
One very important option to note is that the AAOs can define a level that automatically audits the actions of the DBSAs and/or the DBSSOs. This prevents any DBSSOs to manipulate the audit masks to remove himself from the audited users. This also shows the importance of implementing real role separation.
Another note about the audit levels: You may notice that the levels (besides 0 which means off) are all odd numbers. If you're using older versions of IDS you may see references to even numbers. These were equivalents to the ones specified above, but instead of writing to log files the audit facility would send the audit info to the underlying operating system auditing facility. This was not standard, and didn't work on all platforms. In the latest IDS versions the support for those levels were discontinued.
Another important configuration is the audit error mode (-e). This defines the behavior of the instance when it need to audit something, but can't write to the audit log:
- 0 - Continues the normal processing, without writing the audit log
- 1 - Suspends the thread/session that need to be audited, and keeps trying to record the audit log
- 3 - The instance shuts down
So, you have to choose how important the audit is for you... If you can live without it, set it to
0. If you think you can continue to work on the instance (other sessions may not being audited), set it to
1. If you consider auditing to be crucial, you can stop the instance by setting it to
3, meaning it will shutdown if it finds a problem when trying to write the audit log.
The other options are all relative to the audit masks creation and manipulation and are more or less self explanatory.
Where and how does the engine store the audit information?There are three types of
audit information in the auditing facility:
- The audit masks definition
- The audit facility configuration (level, path, file size and error mode)
- The audit logs or the audited information
The audit mask definitions are stored in the sysmaster database and it will survive any reboot. The sysmaster database has several tables containing audit configuration info:
sysaudit, sysadtinfo, syscrtadt.
The audit facility configuration is stored in a file called adtcfg.<servernum> located in the $INFORMIXDIR/aaodir. Please note that there is an annoying
bug relative to this file usage: Whenever you change the audit facility configuration this file will be updated, but when the server starts it looks at the contents of the file called
adtcfg located in the same directory. So you must copy the
adtcfg.<servernum> file to
adtcfg. This is also one of the reasons why this directory should be unique for each $INFORMIXDIR you have on the same system. This bug did not happen in my testing environment with IDS 11.50.UC1. I hit it with previous versions (7.31.FD7 and 10.00.FC4).
This file contains the following configuration parameters:
- ADTMODE
The audit level
- ADTPATH
The path where the audit log files are created
- ADTSIZE
The size for each audit log file (in bytes)
- ADTERR
The error mode of the audit facility
Finally, the audit logs will be created in the path specified by the
-p option of
onaudit or by the ADTPATH configuration parameter of the
adtcfg file.
What do the audit logs contain?The audit logs are text files that contain entries for each action run from the list of audit actions.
The information for each line will have the same structure, but some fields contain different meanings for different mnemonics or actions.
IDS provides an utility called
onshowaudit that will read these audit logs and will generate pipe separated files that you can load into a table with the following structure:
CREATE TABLE frag_logs (
adttag CHAR(4), -- The audited mnemonic
date_time DATETIME YEAR TO FRACTION(3), -- The action timestamp
hostname CHAR(18), -- The client hostname
pid INT, -- The client PID
server CHAR(18), -- The DB server name
username CHAR(8), -- The username
errno INT, -- The error number
code CHAR(4), -- The error code
dbname CHAR(18), -- The database name
tabid INT, -- The table or object ID
objname CHAR(18), -- The object name
extra_1 INT, -- Extra info specific for the mnemonic
partno INT, -- Partition number (usefull for partitioned tables)
row_num INT, -- The row ID
login CHAR(8), -- The database login
flags INT, -- Flags specific for each mnemonic
extra_2 VARCHAR(160,1) -- Extra info specifc for the mnemonic
);
The audit logs will have a name with the following nomenclature:
<servername>.<log_number>. The
log_number will be a sequential number. When the current file reaches the size of ADTSIZE, this number is incremented and a new file is created. Only the AAOs will be able to access these files, so once again, this will prevent any change by people who manage the instance (DBSSAs) or by people who define the audit masks (DBSSOs).
How painful is the auditing?This is the million dollar question. Every customer that thinks about implementing the audit functionality asks how much impact will it have on their instances? And usually they want an answer specifying a percentage of performance impact... Unfortunately for me, I will never receive a million dollars by answering this question, simply because there is no answer!
Let's keep this topic on the technical level... How can we specify the impact if we don't know what (and who) will be audited? And even if we did, how could we specify the impact, if we don't know how many times the audited actions will happen?
Although I really think there is no answer, we can of course discuss this topic... For example, let's consider that we want to audit everybody, but we only want to audit the session creation (STSN), and the GRANTs and REVOKEs on tables (GRTB and RVTB). In a normal system you can do this and will probably don't even be able to measure a performance impact... I mean, how many CONNECTs and GRANT/REVOKEs do you do?
On the other hand, let's imagine you want to audit every table row that it read by everyone (RDRW). I'd bet your instance will suffer a very large impact.
So, regarding performance costs, what we need is to clearly define the needs of the auditing process, and to accept that some things just can't be audited (unless you reduce it to a few users for example). Establishing the RDRW mnemonic may be acceptable if you define it just for your DBAs... In short, the million dollar answer would be "it depends", but no one would pay so much money for such a poor answer...
ExamplesI will try to show some very basic configuration of the audit facility, in order to demonstrate the concepts exposed above. I will implement role separation. Let's start with a fresh IDS 11.50 installation in /usr/informix:
[root@PacMan srvr1150uc1]# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel)
[root@PacMan srvr1150uc1]# pwd
/usr/informix/srvr1150uc1
[root@PacMan srvr1150uc1]# ls -lia
total 132
750742 drwxr-xr-x 25 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 .
456970 drwxr-xr-x 12 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:14 ..
750755 drwxrwxr-x 2 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 aaodir
750756 drwxr-xr-x 2 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:26 bin
750757 drwxrwxr-x 2 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 dbssodir
752279 drwxrwxr-x 4 root root 4096 Jul 13 17:25 demo
750767 drwxr-xr-x 3 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 doc
750760 drwxrwxr-x 4 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:26 etc
751451 drwxr-xr-x 12 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 extend
752645 drwxrwxr-x 2 root root 4096 Jul 13 17:25 forms
750774 drwxr-xr-x 7 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 gls
751483 drwxr-xr-x 3 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 gsk
751478 drwxr-xr-x 2 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:26 gskit
752401 drwxrwxr-x 4 root root 4096 Jul 13 17:25 help
750754 drwxr-xr-x 2 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 ids_license
750762 drwxr-xr-x 6 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 incl
752232 drwxrwxr-x 2 root root 4096 Jul 13 17:25 ism
750758 drwxr-xr-x 3 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 lib
750751 drwxr-xr-x 3 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 master_license
750771 drwxr-xr-x 3 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 msg
750764 drwxr-xr-x 3 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 release
752736 drwxrwxr-x 4 root root 4096 Jul 13 17:25 snmp
751482 drwxrwx--- 2 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 ssl
750749 drwxrwx--- 2 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 20:39 tmp
752765 drwxr-xr-x 2 informix informix 4096 Jul 13 17:25 uninstall_ids1150
751450 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root informix 29713 Apr 25 00:42 uninstallserver
[root@PacMan srvr1150uc1]#
Then, using the ixvirtdir script I'll create a new INFORMIXDIR called srvr1150uc1_cheetah2:
[root@PacMan srvr1150uc1]# ixvirtdir /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/ /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1_cheetah2 11.5 ixdbsa ixaao ixdbsso
[root@PacMan srvr1150uc1]# ls -lia /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1_cheetah2/
total 24
456978 drwxr-xr-x 6 informix informix 4096 Jul 14 00:41 .
456970 drwxr-xr-x 13 informix informix 4096 Jul 14 00:41 ..
457097 drwxrwx--- 2 informix ixaao 4096 Jul 14 00:41 aaodir
457079 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 29 Jul 14 00:41 bin -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/bin
457096 drwxrwx--- 2 informix ixdbsso 4096 Jul 14 00:41 dbssodir
457080 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 30 Jul 14 00:41 demo -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/demo
457081 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 29 Jul 14 00:41 doc -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/doc
457098 drwxrwxr-x 4 informix ixdbsa 4096 Jul 14 00:41 etc
457082 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 32 Jul 14 00:41 extend -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/extend
457083 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 31 Jul 14 00:41 forms -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/forms
457084 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 29 Jul 14 00:41 gls -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/gls
457095 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 29 Jul 14 00:41 gsk -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/gsk
457094 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 31 Jul 14 00:41 gskit -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/gskit
457085 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 30 Jul 14 00:41 help -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/help
457092 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 37 Jul 14 00:41 ids_license -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/ids_license
457086 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 30 Jul 14 00:41 incl -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/incl
457087 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 29 Jul 14 00:41 ism -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/ism
457088 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 29 Jul 14 00:41 lib -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/lib
457093 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 40 Jul 14 00:41 master_license -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/master_license
457089 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 29 Jul 14 00:41 msg -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/msg
457090 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 33 Jul 14 00:41 release -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/release
457091 lrwxrwxrwx 1 informix informix 30 Jul 14 00:41 snmp -> /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1/snmp
457221 drwxr-xr-x 3 informix informix 4096 Jul 14 00:41 ssl
We need to make
oninit executable to anyone:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix-> ls -lia $INFORMIXDIR/bin/oninit
750793 -rwsr-sr-x 1 root informix 15274592 Jul 13 17:26 /usr/informix/srvr1150uc1_cheetah2/bin/oninit
Then I setup several users for several roles:
- dbsauser belongs to ixdbsa group, will be the DBSA
- ssouser belongs to ixdbsso group will be the DBSSO
- aaouser belongs to ixaao group will be the AAO
I will not use user
informix except for storage file creation.
So, as user dbsauser I will initialize the instance:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> id
uid=506(dbsauser) gid=506(ixdbsa) groups=506(ixdbsa)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> oninit -iwv
This action will initialize IBM Informix Dynamic Server;
any existing IBM Informix Dynamic Server databases will NOT be accessible -
Do you wish to continue (y/n)? y
Checking group membership to determine server run mode...succeeded
Reading configuration file '/usr/informix/srvr1150uc1_cheetah2/etc/onconfig.cheetah2'...succeeded
Creating /INFORMIXTMP/.infxdirs...succeeded
Creating infos file "/usr/informix/srvr1150uc1_cheetah2/etc/.infos.cheetah2"...succeeded
Linking conf file "/usr/informix/srvr1150uc1_cheetah2/etc/.conf.cheetah2"...succeeded
Checking config parameters...succeeded
Writing to infos file...succeeded
Allocating and attaching to shared memory...succeeded
Creating resident pool 4818 kbytes...succeeded
Allocating 50016 kbytes for buffer pool of 2K page size...succeeded
Initializing rhead structure...
succeeded
Initialization of Encryption...succeeded
Initializing ASF...succeeded
Initializing Dictionary Cache and SPL Routine Cache...succeeded
Bringing up ADM VP...succeeded
Creating VP classes...succeeded
Onlining 0 additional cpu vps...succeeded
Onlining 2 IO vps...succeeded
Forking main_loop thread...succeeded
Initializing DR structures...succeeded
Forking 1 'soctcp' listener threads...succeeded
Starting tracing...succeeded
Initializing 8 flushers...succeeded
Initializing log/checkpoint information...succeeded
Initializing dbspaces...succeeded
Opening primary chunks...succeeded
Opening mirror chunks...succeeded
Validating chunks...succeeded
Creating database partition...succeeded
Initialize Async Log Flusher...succeeded
Forking btree cleaner...succeeded
Initializing DBSPACETEMP list...succeeded
Checking database partition index...succeeded
Initializing dataskip structure...succeeded
Checking for temporary tables to drop...succeeded
Forking onmode_mon thread...succeeded
Starting scheduling system...succeeded
Verbose output complete: mode = 5
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser->
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> onstat -
IBM Informix Dynamic Server Version 11.50.UC1 -- On-Line -- Up 00:00:39 -- 88060 Kbytes
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> onstat -m
IBM Informix Dynamic Server Version 11.50.UC1 -- On-Line -- Up 00:00:41 -- 88060 Kbytes
Message Log File: /usr/informix/logs/cheetah2.log
23:12:03 Checkpoint Statistics - Avg. Txn Block Time 0.000, # Txns blocked 0, Plog used 134, Llog used 1123
23:12:04 'sysmaster' database built successfully.
23:12:05 'sysutils' database built successfully.
23:12:05 'sysuser' database built successfully.
23:12:11 Building 'sysadmin' database ...
23:12:11 dynamically allocated 2000 locks
23:12:12 Loading Module
23:12:13 Unloading Module
23:12:13 Loading Module
23:12:13 'sysadmin' database built successfully.
23:12:13 Logical Log 3 Complete, timestamp: 0x20a1b.
23:12:13 SCHAPI: Started dbScheduler thread.
23:12:13 SCHAPI: Started 2 dbWorker threads.
23:12:13 Checkpoint Completed: duration was 1 seconds.
23:12:13 Wed Jul 16 - loguniq 4, logpos 0x206018, timestamp: 0x214ce Interval: 6
23:12:13 Maximum server connections 1
23:12:13 Checkpoint Statistics - Avg. Txn Block Time 0.000, # Txns blocked 1, Plog used 177, Llog used 2086
Perfect... Instance up and running, without user Informix... ok... I cheated a little bit, because I had previously touched/chmod the rootdbs chunk file and gave group permissions for the $INFORMIXDIR/etc/$ONCONFIG file...
No I will create a normal dbspace and a temporary dbspace. Again, the file creation should be done as user
informix. After this let's create the stores demo database...
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix-> id
uid=501(informix) gid=501(informix) groups=501(informix)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix-> pwd
/usr/informix/discos/cheetah2
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix-> touch dbs1.c1 temp1.c1
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix-> chmod 660 dbs1.c1 temp1.c1
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix-> ls -l
total 150152
-rw-rw---- 1 informix informix 0 Jul 16 23:18 dbs1.c1
-rw-rw---- 1 informix informix 153600000 Jul 16 23:17 root_dbs.c1
-rw-rw---- 1 informix informix 0 Jul 16 23:18 temp1.c1
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix->
And again as user
dbsauser:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> id
uid=506(dbsauser) gid=506(ixdbsa) groups=506(ixdbsa)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> onspaces -c -d dbs1 -p /usr/informix/discos/cheetah2/dbs1.c1 -s 50000 -o 0
Verifying physical disk space, please wait ...
Space successfully added.
** WARNING ** A level 0 archive of Root DBSpace will need to be done.
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> onspaces -c -d temp1 -t -p /usr/informix/discos/cheetah2/temp1.c1 -s 10000 -o 0
Verifying physical disk space, please wait ...
Space successfully added.
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> onstat -d
IBM Informix Dynamic Server Version 11.50.UC1 -- On-Line -- Up 00:09:00 -- 88060 Kbytes
Dbspaces
address number flags fchunk nchunks pgsize flags owner name
477787f8 1 0x60001 1 1 2048 N B informix rootdbs
4890fb40 2 0x60001 2 1 2048 N B informix dbs1
487c5e60 3 0x42001 3 1 2048 N TB informix temp1
3 active, 2047 maximum
Chunks
address chunk/dbs offset size free bpages flags pathname
47778958 1 1 0 75000 19181 PO-B /usr/informix/discos/cheetah2/root_dbs.c1
4890fca0 2 2 0 25000 24947 PO-B /usr/informix/discos/cheetah2/dbs1.c1
4889e778 3 3 0 5000 4947 PO-B /usr/informix/discos/cheetah2/temp1.c1
3 active, 32766 maximum
NOTE: The values in the "size" and "free" columns for DBspace chunks are
displayed in terms of "pgsize" of the DBspace to which they belong.
Expanded chunk capacity mode: always
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser->
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> dbaccessdemo stores_demo -log -dbspace dbs1
DBACCESS Demonstration Database Installation Script
Dropping existing stores_demo database ....
Creating stores_demo database ....
So, we have a functional instance with the usual stores_demo database.
Now we need to start the auditing facility... Let's try running onaudit with the
dbsauser:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> id
uid=506(dbsauser) gid=506(ixdbsa) groups=506(ixdbsa)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> onaudit
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
Must be an AAO or DBSSO to run this program.
So, as expected, the instance administrator which in this simple case is also the database administrator for
stores_demo can't even run the onaudit utility... Let's change our identity to aaouser and activate the audit facility, but first, let's try to exceed our role... Let's stop the instance!
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> onmode -ky
Must be a DBSA to run this program
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
Sorry... we can't... We're not a DBSA... :)
But we should be able to configure the audit... Check it:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -l $INFORMIXDIR/aaodir
total 8
-rw-rw-r-- 1 informix informix 1120 Apr 25 00:42 adtcfg
-rw-r--r-- 1 informix informix 812 Apr 25 00:42 adtcfg.std
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -lia /usr/informix/audit_logs
total 8
457224 d--xrwx--- 2 informix ixaao 4096 Jul 17 23:25 .
456970 drwxr-xr-x 15 informix informix 4096 Jul 17 00:13 ..
No specific ADTCFG file for the engine and no files in the /usr/informix/audit_logs directory, which will be the place to store the audit trail files.
Let's activate the audit facility:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> onaudit -l 7 -e 0 -p /usr/informix/audit_logs -s 50000
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -l $INFORMIXDIR/aaodir
total 12
-rw-rw-r-- 1 informix informix 1120 Apr 25 00:42 adtcfg
-rw-rw-r-- 1 informix informix 1216 Jul 18 00:04 adtcfg.0
-rw-r--r-- 1 informix informix 812 Apr 25 00:42 adtcfg.std
So now, we have the adtcfg.0 (0 is the instance SERVERNUM).
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -lia /usr/informix/audit_logs
total 8
457224 d--xrwx--- 2 informix ixaao 4096 Jul 18 00:04 .
456970 drwxr-xr-x 15 informix informix 4096 Jul 17 00:13 ..
459479 -rw-rw---- 1 informix ixaao 0 Jul 18 00:04 cheetah2.0
And we already have an audit trail file. The suffix is a number which will increment when we change the file (using
onaudit or when one file reaches the size we specified.
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> onaudit -c
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
Current audit system configuration:
ADTMODE = 7
ADTERR = 0
ADTPATH = /usr/informix/audit_logs
ADTSIZE = 50000
Audit file = 0
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
And we can see the current audit configuration. Take noticed that because we used audit level 7, DBSA and DBSSO actions will be automatically recorded into the audit log. Let's make a test with dbsauser. A simple connect to sysmaster:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> id
uid=506(dbsauser) gid=506(ixdbsa) groups=506(ixdbsa)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> dbaccess sysmaster <<EOF
select count(*) from sysdatabases;
> EOF
Database selected.
(count(*))
4
1 row(s) retrieved.
Database closed.
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser->
and no, let's check the contents of the audit trail file:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> id
uid=506(dbsauser) gid=506(ixdbsa) groups=506(ixdbsa)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> ls -lia /usr/informix/audit_logs/
ls: /usr/informix/audit_logs/: Permission denied
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser-> cat /usr/informix/audit_logs/cheetah2.0
cat: /usr/informix/audit_logs/cheetah.0: Permission denied
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:dbsauser->
Hmmm... what is a DBSA trying to check something only AAO should do?! :)
So, let's now do it with the correct user:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -lia /usr/informix/audit_logs/
total 12
457224 d--xrwx--- 2 informix ixaao 4096 Jul 18 00:04 .
456970 drwxr-xr-x 15 informix informix 4096 Jul 17 00:13 ..
459479 -rw-rw---- 1 informix ixaao 937 Jul 18 00:14 cheetah2.0
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> cat /usr/informix/audit_logs/cheetah2.0
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:49.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:STSN
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:49.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:OPDB:sysmaster:0:-
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:49.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysdatabases:247
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:49.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysdbspartn:100
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:50.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:513
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:50.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:514
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:50.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:515
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:50.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:516
ONLN|2008-07-18 00:14:50.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|4386|cheetah2|dbsauser|0:CLDB:sysmaster
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
Ah... Ok, now we have the audited data... Let's check it by mnemonic:
- STSN
For STart SessioN, showing timestamp, instance, user, PID... - OPDB
For OPen DataBase, showing timestamp, instance, user, database, PID, return code... - ACTB
For ACess TaBle, showing the table, the table owner/schema, the database etc. - RDRW
For ReaD RoW, showing the timestamp, instance, database, table id and rowid - CLDB
For CLose DataBase, showing the timestamp, instance, PID and database...
This simple test shows you the potential that RDRW has to damage your instance performance... A full table scan on a big table will be enough to fill thounsands or millions of audit trail entry lines.
Now, let's create the _default global mask. I'll use user informix to test it.
To start, let's audit the same events we saw in the previous example, but first let's change the audit log:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -ltr /usr/informix/audit_logs/
total 0
-rw-rw---- 1 informix ixaao 937 Jul 20 17:37 cheetah2.0
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> onaudit -n
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -ltr /usr/informix/audit_logs/
total 0
-rw-rw---- 1 informix ixaao 937 Jul 20 17:37 cheetah2.0
-rw-rw---- 1 informix ixaao 0 Jul 20 17:40 cheetah2.1
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
And now, with the ssouser, let's create the _default mask:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser-> id
uid=507(ssouser) gid=508(ixdbsso) groups=508(ixdbsso)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser-> ls -ltr /usr/informix/audit_logs/
ls: /usr/informix/audit_logs/: Permission denied
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser-> id
uid=507(ssouser) gid=508(ixdbsso) groups=508(ixdbsso)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser-> onaudit -a -u _default -e STSN,OPDB,CLDB,ACTB,RDRW
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser-> onaudit -o -y
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
_default - ACTB,CLDB,OPDB,RDRW,STSN
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser->
And now, using another user, informix, let's do the same we did before and check the audit trail log:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix-> id
uid=501(informix) gid=501(informix) groups=501(informix)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix-> dbaccess sysmaster < select count(*) from sysdatabases;
> EOF
Database selected.
(count(*))
5
1 row(s) retrieved.
Database closed.
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:informix->
And now, the content of the audit trail:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -ltr /usr/informix/audit_logs/
total 0
-rw-rw---- 1 informix ixaao 0 Jul 20 17:37 cheetah2.0
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> onaudit -n
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> ls -ltr /usr/informix/audit_logs/
total 0
-rw-rw---- 1 informix ixaao 0 Jul 20 17:37 cheetah2.0
-rw-rw---- 1 informix ixaao 0 Jul 20 17:40 cheetah2.1
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> cat /usr/informix/audit_logs/cheetah2.1
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:STSN
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:OPDB:sysmaster:0:-
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysadtinfo:214
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:RDRW:sysmaster:214:1025:0
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysaudit:261
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:RDRW:sysmaster:261:1048836:513
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:syscrtadt:215
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:LSAM:_default
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:INRW:sysmaster:215:1026:6913
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:syscrtadt:215
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|100:LSAM:_default
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:INRW:sysmaster:215:1026:6913
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0:CLDB:sysmaster
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:STSN
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:OPDB:sysmaster:0:-
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysdatabases:247
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysdbspartn:100
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:513
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:514
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:515
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:516
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:RDRW:sysmaster:100:1048578:517
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:48:24.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8255|cheetah2|informix|0:CLDB:sysmaster
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
You may notice that there are entries referring to two Process IDs. The first (8059) refers to the onaudit command we used first to define the _default mask. The other (8255) refers to the dbaccess process and is similar to the first test we did. So, any change to the audit masks, which must be done by a DBSSO user is automatically audited if we choose a correct audit level (as we did).
Again we see the RDRW mnemonic which is able to cause serious performance issues.
This is a nice opportunity to show you the effect of the _exclude mask. Let's include the RDRW in this mask. But first let's change the audit trail log file again with:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> onaudit -n
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
Now, with ssouser, let's add the _exclude audit mask:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser-> id
uid=507(ssouser) gid=508(ixdbsso) groups=508(ixdbsso)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser-> onaudit -a -u _exclude -e RDRW
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:ssouser->
Since we're using audit level 7, this action should have been logged. Let's see how:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> cat /usr/informix/audit_logs/cheetah2.2
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:21:38.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8478|cheetah2|aaouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:syscrtadt:215
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:21:38.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8478|cheetah2|aaouser|0:CLDB:sysmaster
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:STSN
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:OPDB:sysmaster:0:-
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysadtinfo:214
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:RDRW:sysmaster:214:1025:0
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysaudit:261
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:syscrtadt:215
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|100:LSAM:_exclude
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:INRW:sysmaster:215:1026:6913
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysaudit:261
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:INRW:sysmaster:261:1048836:514
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:syscrtadt:215
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:CRAM:_exclude
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:INRW:sysmaster:215:1026:6913
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:22:42.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8484|cheetah2|ssouser|0:CLDB:sysmaster
So the DBSSO action was fully logged. Now let's change to another audit log file, and repeat the same dbaccess we did previously with user dbsauser:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> onaudit -n
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
and let's see the file contents:
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:23:00.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8486|cheetah2|informix|0:STSN
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:23:00.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8486|cheetah2|informix|0:OPDB:sysmaster:0:-
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:23:00.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8486|cheetah2|informix|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysdatabases:247
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:23:00.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8486|cheetah2|informix|0:ACTB:sysmaster:informix:sysdbspartn:100
ONLN|2008-07-20 18:23:00.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8486|cheetah2|informix|0:CLDB:sysmaster
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
So, similar to the previous examples, but without the RDRW event.
These examples should give you a very basic feeling on how we set up and configure the auditing facility. Following, I will try to show how to process the audit files, and how we can use SQL to do it.
Using SQL to analyze your auditing informationI have created an SQL file with the CREATE TABLE above, and I will obtain a file in unload format (PIPE separated), with the contents of the audit logs we generated. To do this I will use the onshowaudit utility:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> id
uid=508(aaouser) gid=507(ixaao) groups=507(ixaao)
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> onshowaudit -l -I -n 0 >audit_logs.unl
Program Over.
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> head -30 audit_logs.unl
ONSHOWAUDIT Secure Audit Utility
INFORMIX-SQL Version 11.50.UC1
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0|STSN||||||||||
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0|OPDB|sysmaster|||||||0|-|
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0|ACTB|sysmaster|214|||||informix||sysadtinfo|
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0|RDRW|sysmaster|214|||1025|0||||
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0|ACTB|sysmaster|261|||||informix||sysaudit|
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0|RDRW|sysmaster|261|||1048836|513||||
ONLN|2008-07-20 17:44:15.000|PacMan.onlinedomus.net|8059|cheetah2|ssouser|0|ACTB|sysmaster|215|||||informix||syscrtadt|
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
As you can see there are 3 annoying header lines at the top. I erased them with vi.
So now, we're prepared to load this into an audit table that we create with the SQL above:
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> dbaccess stores_demo frag_logs.sql
Database selected.
Table created.
Database closed.
cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser-> dbaccess stores_demo -
Database selected.
> load from audit_logs.unl insert into frag_logs;
58 row(s) loaded.
> cheetah2@PacMan.onlinedomus.net:aaouser->
So now, you have a table with all the info collected by the auditing facility. You can then explore it using simple SQL. You can search for specific entries or simply create reports based on it.
Hopefully this will be enough to get you started with the auditing facility, but I'd like to point out several possible problems (with solutions) and a few other considerations.
Possible issues:- Versions 9.x, 10.x and 11.x may raise an error like:
Onaudit -- Audit Subsystem Configuration Utility
Cannot set audit configuration parameters.
Problem may be caused by lack of permission, bad
parameter values, or bad parameter combinations.
This error usually relates to the fact that the oninit processes are not running as user root.
This was done in versions 7.x, but was changed in versions 9.x. If running versions 9.x and versions 10.x you may set a variable called NONROOT_OFF to value 1:
NONROOT_OFF=1
export NONROOT_OFF
before starting the instance. This will force the oninit processes to run as root. The need to run as root derives from the fact that the engine must create the audit log files with specific user/group and root privileges are needed for this.
At least in IDS 11.50 this doesn't happen if you start your intance using a DBSA user.
- In some IDS versions you may need to explicitly grant privileges on the sysmaster tables to the DBSSO and/or AAO users. The tables are sysmaster:sysadtinfo and sysmaster:sysaudit
- In some IDS versions, the audit facility will change/create the adtcfg.<servernum> file, but the instance will only look at the adtcfg file on startup. Be sure to confirm your version doesn't have this issue, or if it has, be sure to copy the file generated by the auditing facility to the one used by the instance startup process. In this case you have to do this after each change of the auditing facility configuration
Note that on version 11.50 which I used to generate the examples on this article, I didn't notice any of the above issues. I could reproduce the first one only if I start the engine with user informix which I didn't include in the group od DBSAs
Final recommendations- Test everything in a test environment using the same OS and IDS version you use in production. Some of the changes may cause your system to become unusable or unstable if something goes wrong
- If you think about using the auditing facility for compliance reasons, don't do it without creating full role separation
- If you implement full role separation, be sure that the different teams and/or users are able to work together, and that each one understands the impact of his activity in the overall use of your database instance(s)
- Consider carefully the settings for ADTERR. Informix allows you to choose what to do if you can't register the events on the auditing log. This setting can decide the instance availability
- Think carefully about how to use the auditing logs information. If you intend to use SQL for processing the information, be sure to guarantee that the information can only be managed by the AAO group users. Informix does everything to guarantee the audit logs information security, so you must be sure to guarantee this security after you extract the info and process it. Consider using a different instance and possibly a different machine to process this data
- Understand that the auditing information can be useful for your database administration purposes. To give you an example I help managing a reasonable sized system and the audit facility was the best way to measure some things like:
- We had 11 connections per second
- We execute more than 90 stored procedures per second
- We create more than 6 temporary tables per second
- Think very carefully about activating some action mnemonics like RDRW, INRW and DLRW. This can have a dramatic impact on your intance performance. It really depends on which users will use masks with this mnemonics active, and how many DML operations they do.
References:
The excitement continues to mount as we move towards the October 2-3,2008 IQ Visual Mapping Conference to be held in Morristown, NJ. I am very happy to share with you that Michael Scherotter who is well known to the Mindjet Community has agreed to speak. Michael was the force behind Mindjet Labs when he was working at Mindjet and was an active member of the mind mapping community. Michael is is currently an Evangelist with Microsoft Corporation. As part of Microsoft’s Communications Sector evangelism team, Michael focuses on enterprise development tools and technologies for telecommunications, web hosting, and media & entertainment companies. Educated as an architect with both a Bachelors of Architecture and Masters of Architecture specializing in design tool development, Michael brings a sense of creativity and design to synergistic software development. Throughout his 13-year career in software development, Michael has specialized in combining software in innovative ways. You can read up about what Michael is up to at his blog called the Synergist.
